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connecting energy markets in two or more countries.  effort to consumers in terms of lower energy prices,
A key feature of investment taking place in Latin  higher environmental standards, and a more reliable
America is the convergence of gas and electricity  energy system.
markets. Many projects are being developed to supply  The experience in Latin America's Southern Cone
gas to new power generation plants needed to meet  shows how technological innovation, economic
electricity demand.  deregulation, and regional integration make it possible to
Construction of a pipeline over the Andes mountains  build major international  gas pipeline projects within a
to supply gas from Argentina to energy markets in  competitive framework and without direct state
central Chile was an idea long unfulfilled for political,  involvement.
economic, and technical reasons. Great changes have
now taken place in a very short time.
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Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterInvestment  in Natural Gas Pipelines
in the Southern Cone of Latin America
The natural gas pipelines between Argentina and Chile provide an interesting and valuable
case study of large-scale investments in competitive environments. Jadresic, a former
Minister of Energy in Chile argues that a competitive energy sector andfree  entry were
important policy  initiatives to spur the cross-border investments which have had a beneficial
impact on the energy sector and the environment in Chile.
Alejandro JadresicINVESTMENT IN NATURAL GAS PIPELINES IN THE
SOUTHERN CONE OF LATIN AMERICA
Alejandro Jadresic'
1.  Introduction
Increasing  demand  for  clean  sources  of  energy is  expanding investment  in  natural  gas
infrastructure around  the  world.  Massive resources  are being  allocated to  extraction  and
processing  plants,  pipelines  and  other  transportation  means,  distribution  networks  and
equipment for end users. This investment process is also taking place in Latin America with
major  projects  being  developed  in  countries  such  as  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Many of these are international projects
involving pipelines that interconnect energy markets in two or more countries.
2.  The Underlying Forces
One of the key features of the investment process that is taking place in Latin America is the
convergence of gas and electricity markets. Many of the projects are being developed to supply
gas to new power generation plants that are required in  order to meet increasing electricity
demand.
In turn, convergence of gas and electricity markets in Latin America is explained by three basic
forces (see Figure 1):
(i) technological inmovation;  in particular, combined cycle generation plants fed with
natural gas have become the most efficient and cleanest way of expanding the electricity
system;
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1(ii) economic deregulation has opened the energy markets for private investment within
a competitive environment,
(iii) regional economic integration and convergence of economic policies is making it
much easier to develop international projects.
This situation has created great opportunities in the power and gas sectors as well as great
challenges for governments and energy companies. Analyzing how these challenges have been
met in Latin America can provide very useful lessons for other countries and regions, such as
East Asia, that need to develop natural gas pipelines.
In what follows this document will focus in the pipelines that have been built in the Southern
Cone of Latin America in order to supply natural gas from Argentina to Chile. They are a very
interesting case  since  they  have been  developed entirely by  the  private  sector  within  a
competitive regulatory environment and with no state guarantees.
3.  Investment in the Southern Cone of Latin America
The construction of a pipeline over the Andes mountains in order to supply gas from Argentina
to energy markets in central Chile was an old idea that until recently had not been achieved due
to political, economic and technical reasons. The political situation was a constraint since both
countries had various disputes in the past regarding their international boundaries that brought
them close to war twenty years ago. From an economic point of view, construction of a pipeline
was a major challenge because the states did not have the money to finance such a project and
the private sector did not have the incentives to do so. Technically, the project was a difficult
task since it had to be built 3000 meters over the Andes mountains.
In a very short period of time things have changed dramatically. The first major project -the Gas
Andes pipeline- started transporting gas to Santiago, in the central zone of Chile, in August
21997 and earlier that year a  smaller one -the Magallanes pipeline- started to feed gas to  a
methanol plant located in  the Magallanes Strait. Four additional projects are being built at
present and will be operating before the year 2000: the Gas Atacama and Nor Andino pipelines
will be transporting gas to the mining regions in the north of Chile, the Gas del Pacifico pipeline
will distribute gas to the industrial city of Concepcion and a new pipeline loop will be sending
more Argentinean gas to the methanol plant in Magallanes.
Overall investment in international pipeline projects between Chile and Argentina in the 1996-
2000 period will be over US$  1.5 billion plus US$ 0.5 billion corresponding to  distribution
networks in  Chile. Including planned investment in  combined cycle power generators and
methanol plants total figures get close to US$ 4 billion which is a very substantial amount for an
economy as small as Chile (see Figure 2).
In order to explain how this scenario of strong gas interconnection  between Chile and Argentina
came about I will move five years back into the past and describe the challenges that were then
being faced by the Chilean energy sector.
4.  The Energy Challenge
Five years ago Chile was facing a major economic and environmental challenge: how to meet
the rapidly increasing energy needs in  a country that lacks domestic competitive sources of
energy. Energy consumption was growing about 7% per year and it was expected that it would
keep increasing at such rates since per capita consumption was still too small in comparison
with other developing countries (see Figure 3).
New energy needs were being met primarily by importing more oil and coal, both of which
accounted for slightly over 50% of total energy consumption (see Figure 4). Chilean production
of oil had declined under 8% of domestic needs and the coal mines -which still accounted for
about one third of the market- were closing due to very high costs of production and high sulfur
content. On the other hand there were increasing economic and environmental constraints in
expanding hydroelectric capacity and utilization of firewood as a fuel whereas domestic natural
3gas reserves were located south in the Magallanes Strait, too far from the main consumption
centers in central and northern Chile.
The challenge was even more acute in the power industry where consumption was growing
about 8% per year (see Figure 5) and due to economic and environmental limitations it was
becoming more difficult to build new hydroelectric and coal plants both of which accounted for
about 90% of the generation matrix (see Figure 6).
Moreover, the Chilean energy system was very isolated and autartic. Even though we imported
most of the oil and coal that we consumed, our electric grids were not interconnected with
energy-rich Argentina and  we  did  not  have  oil  or gas  pipelines  going  across  the Andes
mountains (see Figure 7).
5.  The Regulatory Framework
Notwithstanding the limitations of geography, Chile had taken important steps in modernizing
its energy sector. In  fact Chile was a pioneering country in deregulating and privatizing its
power industry.
5.1  The Electricity Industry
In 1982 a new law restructured the electricity sector. It unbundled generation, transmission and
distribution activities and introduced competition among different generators. A pool  system
was  created in  order  to  coordinate load  dispatch. A  marginal  cost  pricing  scheme  was
introduced to  value  load transactions between generators and  a  price cap mechanism was
introduced to regulate prices charged to small customers. Later in the eighties the two main state
owned companies were privatized as well as several regional utilities.
Deregulation and privatization of the electricity sector had resulted in efficient operation and a
high  level of private investment. There was however the feeling that there was not enough
competition in the market due to a relatively high degree of market concentration, a high level
4of vertical integration and the accumulation of the main water rights in just  one generation
company.  As  a  consequence  prices  still remained high  in  comparison with  international
standards.
5.2  The Gas Industry
Regarding the gas industry, not much had happened primarily because Chile did not have gas
reserves except far south in Magallanes where it was used for some industrial purposes and to
supply energy to the city of Punta Arenas. LPG was the dominant source of gas for domestic
consumers (see Figure 8).
As was said before, the idea of building a gas pipeline across the Andes had not succeeded but
starting in  1990, after diplomatic relations had  improved (a Mutual Friendship Treaty was
signed in 1984) and democratic governments had been installed in both countries some steps
forward were  taken.  In  that  year there  was  an  attempt by  both  governments to  call  an
international bid to allocate the project to a group of investors but it failed primarily because it
was not clear how to choose among different bidders and under what rules the project would
operate after construction. Later, in 1991 a Gas Interconnection Protocol was signed between
the two  countries stating  some conditions for private  investors interested in  building  and
operating a pipeline, such as the following: (i) it left it to buyers and sellers to negotiate the
price of gas, (ii) pipelines should operate under open access conditions, (iii) a maximum quota
was set for gas exports from Argentina, and (iv) gas should originate from the Neuquen Basin in
Argentina. Within this  framework the Transgas international consortia started to  study the
project and obtained a permit to export gas from Argentina. Some time later a second group of
companies started studying the Gas Andes pipeline, an alternative project to transport gas from
Argentina to Chile.
6.  The Energy Policy
The administration of President Eduardo Frei that took office in 1994 announced that its energy
policy would seek to satisfy Chile's increasing energy needs in a way that would protect the
5environment and the rights of consumers. Consequently the energy policy would be based on
three basic objectives.
The  first  objective  was  to  promote  private  investment both  from  Chilean  and  foreign
companies. That would require clear, simple and stable rules that had to  be  established in
legislation.
The second objective was to promote market competition both among different companies and
among energy sources, since competition is the best guarantee for efficiency in production and
consumer welfare.
The third objective was to protect the environment and to ensure that energy projects minimized
their environmental and safety-related impacts. Prevention was to be a key principle for energy
development.
Based on these three principles several decisions were made regarding the electricity and gas
sectors.
6.1  Electricity Policy
State owned companies still had an important participation in the power industry. COLBUN,
the  state-owned  generator,  owned  12%  of  the  generation capacity  of  the  SIC  (Central
Interconnected  System) while the  generation division of  CODELCO (the leading  Chilean
copper producer) accounted for 55% of the capacity of the SING (Northern Interconnected
System). It was decided that both generators would be privatized but with some constraints in
order to ensure that they would be bought by new entrants and investment plans would not be
delayed. It was hoped that competition would intensify and larger investment projects would
follow. Accordingly the energy division of CODELCO was  sold in  1996 and the  sale of
COLBUN followed in 1997.
6The principles of the 1982 electricity law were correct but some of its nonns  and regulations
lacked clarity, were obsolete, caused conflicts among companies or made it difficult for new
investors to  enter the industry. It was decided that  a general ruling ("reglamento") of  the
electricity law  would be  prepared  in  order to  improve norms  on  issues such  as  dispatch
coordination, payment of transmission fees and quality of service standards. These new norms
would facilitate competition in the market place. The new ruling was enacted in  1997 and
started to be applied in 1998.
New norms would also be  sought regarding water rights so that companies requesting such
rights would be forced to hand them back to the water authority or sell them if they were not
used in new hydroelectric projects. Since it would take some time until Congress could analyze
and approve such reform, a request was filed to the antitrust commission, which in 1996 stated
that the water authority could only grant new water rights to companies that could ensure that
they would build new projects.
Last, a special effort would be made so that natural gas coming from Argentina could be used
on equal terms by any power generation company. Natural gas was considered a key element to
lift entry barriers and promote competition in  the power  generation market,  provided that
pipelines were built and open access to transportation services could be enforced. In order to do
so a proper regulatory framework had to be established.
6.2  Natural Gas Policy
Natural gas was considered to be essential not only to promote competition in the electricity
market but to diversify the sources of energy supply, to protect the environment and to improve
efficiency of the energy sector. Fulfillment of such objectives required that natural gas could
compete on equal terms with other fuels.
Negotiations were started with the Argentinean energy authorities in order to liberalize the gas
interconnection protocol.  By  1995 an  agreement was  reached which  lifted  all  constraints
regarding volume of gas to be exported from Argentina as well as the basin where it should be
7produced. According to this new agreement there would be  as many pipelines as the private
sector was willing to finance, yet they should operate under open access conditions. Prices of
gas and terms of supply would be negotiated directly  between buyers and sellers of gas.
Regulatory norms were prepared in Chile in  order to enforce open  access to  transportation
services and to allow pipeline developers  to obtain rights of way over private or state land. Such
norms were included in a Concessions Ruling which was established in  1995. Another ruling
was dictated the same year in order to impose safety standards and quality requirements to
pipelines  and  distribution networks so that people  and physical installations would not  be
endangered.
Additional  norms  were  established forcing manufacturing industry  located in  Santiago to
severely reduce atmospheric emissions by 1998. The purpose was to reduce the air pollution
levels in Santiago and indirectly to provide incentives for industry to shift to natural gas as a
fuel or alternatively to spend on expensive filters or other environmentally sound technologies.
7.  The Outcome
The private sector reacted promptly to the policy incentives established by the government and
in a very short period of time  several projects were started. I will briefly refer to two very
interesting cases.
7.1  The Transgas - Gas Andes Dispute
The first case is the fierce market dispute that took place between two international consortia
that wanted to  build the  first pipeline to  supply natural gas  to power  generators and  gas
distribution companies located in Central Chile.
Transgas was  a  consortium  led by  Enersis, the  largest Chilean electricity holding. Major
partners were Tenneco Gas, from the United States and British Gas, from the United Kingdom.
The former was supposed to be the operator of the pipeline and the latter would become the
8operator of a company that would be created to distribute gas in Santiago and other cities. Minor
partners were YPF, the largest Argentinean oil and gas company, and ENAP, the state owned
Chilean oil company. The idea of Transgas was to build a pipeline that would traverse the
Andes from the Neuquen basin to Concepcion and then would move north to supply gas to
Santiago, Valparaiso and other Chilean cities. Total investment was planned to be just US$ 600
rnillion in the pipeline plus additional resources to build distribution networks and combined
cycle plants in Chile (see Figure 9).
Gas Andes was a consortia led by Novacorp from Canada. Major partners were Chilgener (later
called Gener) the second largest Chilean power generator, and Gasco, an old Chilean company
which distributed city gas in  Santiago and LPG in  several Chilean cities. Novacorp would
become the pipeline operator and Gasco would become the major shareholder of Metrogas, a
new distribution company which would absorb the city gas grid in Santiago. Minor partners
were Copec, the largest Chilean gasoline retailer, and CGC, an Argentinean energy company.
Gas Andes had originated when Chilgener and Gasco decided to create an alternative project
that would compete with Transgas. Their idea was to build a pipeline that would bring gas to
Santiago directly from Mendoza, where it would interconnect with the Argentinean pipeline
system. Extensions would be built to Valparaiso and other places in Chile. Total investment in
the pipeline would be US$ 325 million not including extensions in Chile, distribution networks
or generation plants.
Transgas  and  Gas  Andes  entered  into  an  intense  competitive race  trying  to  sign  gas
transportation contracts that would allow them to finance their projects. Since the rules set by
the government forced them to offer the same conditions to all customers, transportation price
and guarantees backing transportation services became the main competitive tools. Open access
regulations required that they established an "open  season" period during which  customers
would file for transportation services; the pipeline consortia would then announce their price
and other service conditions.
The commercial dispute caused the transportation price offered by both pipeline consortia to
decline until it reached a competitive level. The dispute was solved when the three main Chilean
9power generators, Endesa, Chilgener and Colbun, decided to sign transportation contracts with
Gas Andes in  order to  feed natural gas to  combined cycle generation plants that  each one
decided to build. Interestingly, Endesa signed a contract with this pipeline even though its major
shareholder was Enersis, the leader of the Transgas project. Open access acted as a safeguard for
a power company that was involved in the project that lost the competitive race.
The Gas Andes project  started to be built at the beginning of  1996 once the environmental
impact assessment study was approved and began to transport gas to a power plant and the grid
of Metrogas in Santiago in August 1997. An extension to Valparaiso was built one year later by
the power companies Endesa and Colbun allowing them to operate their own power plants and
to  supply gas to  two  newly  formed gas utilities, Gas Valpo  and  Energas, which  are  still
competing to sign contracts with industrial and residential users in that zone.
As a result of the fierce competitive race between Transgas and Gas Andes a new clean source
of energy was introduced to Central Chile. There was an immediate pro-competitive effect in
the Central Interconnected System (SIC) which accounts for almost 80% of the Chilean market.
In fact the wholesale price of electricity in Santiago has declined over 35% in real terms since
1994. Natural gas has become an effective competitor to hydroelectricity and coal, the two
traditional sources of power in the central system (see Figure 10).
Natural gas also had a strong impact on the manufacturing sector. Just one year after it was
introduced in Santiago it accounted for around 40% of total consumption of energy (excluding
electricity) by industrial users in that city. It has been estimated that by 2005 that share will
reach up to 70% (see Figure 11). Tighter environmental norms for atmospheric emissions have
been a very strong incentive for gas penetration. In fact, natural gas will allow large reductions
in industrial emissions of the main sources of air pollution: around 62% for particles, 33% for
NOx and 79% both for S02 and CO.
107.2  The Gas Dispute in Northern Chile
The second case to be presented is the market dispute that is taking place in northern Chile in
order to supply power and energy to the mining region in the area. Even though the Northern
Interconnected System (SING) accounts for just  20% of Chilean power consumption, it has
been the most dynamic energy market in recent years -growing at about 15% per year- due to
large investments in new mining ventures.
Until the early 1990s the SING was dominated by two state-owned companies: the power
division of  the  copper producer  Codelco and  Edelnor, owner  of  some  power  units  and
transmission lines. Coal, and to a lesser extent, oil, were the main sources of energy. Due to the
lack of water, the lack of other energy resources and to high transportation costs, the prices of
electricity were much higher than in the rest of the country.
Things started to change with the privatization of Edelnor, in 1993, and Codelco-Tocopilla, in
1996 and investments in new coal operated plants made by Endesa and Gener, the two largest
generators from the central system. Competition was strengthened and the wholesale price of
electricity started to decline.
The  1995  gas  agreement  with  Argentina  and  the  realization that  both  gas  and  electric
interconnection were feasible (a preliminary electric interconnection agreement was signed in
1997) further promoted competition. Accordingly three different projects were defined: the Gas
Atacama pipeline, the Nor Andino pipeline and the Inter Andes transmission line (see Figure
12).
Gas Atacama is led by a partnership between Endesa and the american company CMS, is to be
the pipeline operator. Their purpose is  to build a US$  350 million pipeline from Salta to
Mejillones to supply gas to combined cycle generation plants as well as to industrial users and a
water desalinization plant. Gas Atacama wants to build its own power plants allowing other
customers to contract transportation services on its pipeline.
11Nor Andino is an alternative US$ 330 million pipeline project designed to transport gas from
Salta  to  Tocopilla.  It  is  led by  the  Belgian  company  Tractebel  which  is  the  owner  of
ElectroAndina, formerly the electricity division of Codelco. Another partner in Nor Andino is
Southern Electric, from the United States, which has controlled Edelnor since the time it was
privatized. Both ElectroAndina and Edelnor want to build their own power plants leaving the
pipeline open for third parties to transport gas from Argentina.
Inter Andes is a transmission line project developed by Gener. Its purpose is to interconnect two
combined cycle power plants to be built in Salta by itself with the copper mines and other
electricity consumers located in northern Chile.
A fierce competitive battle has developed among the three projects in northern Chile pushing
downwards the price of power agreed in long term contracts between generators and mining
companies. Even before any of the projects had actually been completed the price of electricity
in real terms at the end of 1998 was almost 50% below the level it had been 5 years ago(see
Figure 13).
Interestingly and unlike what happened in central Chile, the three projects are going ahead and
should be operating by 1999. Still it is unlikely that all the combined cycle generation plants
that have been planned will actually be built, at least at the dates that were initially estimated.
Moreover, the developers of the two pipeline projects -Gas  Atacama and Nor Andino- have
started negotiations in order to coordinate the operations of the pipes so as to minimize costs.
Yet it is clear that customers have greatly benefited from the coming introduction of natural gas
in northern Chile.
8.  The Energy scenario in the Future
The international gas pipeline projects developed in central and northern Chile plus the projects
that are being developed to supply gas from Argentina to  Concepcion and Magallanes  are
changing the structure of the Chilean energy sector. In just five years what used to be an isolated
system has become an  energy market, interconnected with Argentina through gas pipelines,
12electricity transmission lines  and, since  1994, by  an  oil pipeline that  transports  oil  from
Neuquen to  a refinery located near Concepcion. By the year 2000 the Chilean energy map
should look like Figure 14, very different from the map shown in Figure 8. The creation of new
alternatives of supply will significantly strengthen the reliability and flexibility of the energy
system.
The energy interconnection with Argentina will have a major on the Chilean energy mix. It has
been estimated that by 2005 natural gas will represent 23% of the country's  primary energy
source, up from 7% in 1994, reducing the proportion of oil and coal (see Figure 15). The impact
will be greater in the power  sector since the construction of combined cycle plants should
increase the participation of natural gas in the generation mix up to 28% in 2005, a significant
jump from 1% in  1994. In addition to that, electric interconnections should account for about
3% of power supply. Hydroelectricity will continue being the main source of power, but  its
share should decline to about 40% (see Figure 16) thus reducing the vulnerability of the Chilean
electric system during severe drought.
Lower energy prices and more vigorous competition will be very important byproducts of the
developments in  the natural gas industry. As was shown in  the two  cases covered in  this
document, prices have already declined significantly in the power sector, benefiting mining,
manufacturing as well as other industrial and residential consumers. Competition has also been
strengthened in the market for gas and liquid fuels in response to attempts by the gas utilities to
contract with new customers.
A cleaner environment is an additional side effect of the introduction of natural gas to the
Chilean energy market; in fact environmental protection was one of the objectives of the energy
policy. Manufacturing plants in air-polluted Santiago have already shifted to the new fuel and
there are plans to promote utilization of natural gas by buses and other motor vehicles. Other
cities in Chile should be following a similar path.
The experience in the Southern Cone of Latin America shows that technological innovation,
economic  deregulation  and  regional  integration  is  making  it  possible  to  build  major
13international  gas  pipelines  projects  within  a  competitive framework  and  without  direct
involvement by the states. Furthermore, such a framework can bring about great benefits to the
consumers in terms of lower energy prices, higher environmental standards and a more reliable
energy system.
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GAS PIPELINE PROJECTS IN CHILE
(figures  in US$ milions)
PIPELINES BETWEEN  ARGENTINA  AND CHILE
YEAR  PROJECT  INVESTMENT
1996  Magallanes  30
1996-1997  Gas Andes  325
1997  Electrogas extension  88
1998  Magallanes 3rd loap  30
1998  Gas Atacama  350
1998  Nor Andino  330
1998-1999  Gasoducto del Pacifico  350
Total  1.503
DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
1996-2000  Metrogas  400
1998-2000  Energas  44
1998-2000  GasValpo  42
1999-2000  GasSur  46
Total  532
POWER PLANTS  AND END USE EQUIPMENT
C.C. Power plants SIC  565
C.C. Power plants SING  900
Methanol plants  65
Total  1.930
Total investment  3.965
SOURCE:  NATIONAL  ENERGY  COMMISION
15Figure 3








1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
SOURCE: NATIONAL ENERGY COMMISION
16CHILEAN  ENERGY  SECTOR:  THE INITIAL SITUATION
NTE ENERGY  MATRIX  (1994)
*11%  COAL
*41%
OIL  U 24% HIDROELECTRICITY
r0I7%  7
NATURAL  GAS  WOOD & OTHER
SOURCE: NATIONAL  ENERGY  COMMISION
17Figure 5





1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
SOVRCE:  NATIONAL  ENERGY  COMMISION
18Figure 6
CHILEAN  ELECTRICITY  SECTOR:  THE INITIAL  SITUATION
THE GENERATION  MATRIX  (1994)




SOURCE:  NATIONAL  ENERGY COMMISION
19Figure 7







\  ANTSIAGO  Arenas
Valparaiso  SNIG
SING: Noriern  interconnnected  electrical system
SIC: Central interconnected  electrical system
20Figure 8
PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION  OF GAS IN CHILE
Year 1996
Type  Production  Energy Consumption
Millions m'3*  Millions mr3*
Natural Gas  3.632  774
Manufactured Gas  507  486
Blast Furnace  Gas  1.692  1.313
Biogas  77  77
LPG  466  897
e LPG  in ton millions
PARTICIPATION  IN  ENERGY  CONSUMPTION
Year 1996
BLAST FURNACE  GAS,  WBGAS
NATURAL  GAS  .651%
LPG
MANUFACTURED  GAS m9%
Total  21.516  Teracal
SOURCE: NATIONAL ENERGY COMMISION
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THE TRANSGAS  - GASANDES  DISPUTE
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THE NORTHERN CHILE DISPUTE
GAS ATACAMA PIPELINE
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NORTHERN CHILE: THE OUTCOME (SO FAR)
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28Figure 16
CHILEAN  ENERGY  SECTOR: IN THE FUTURE
(2005)
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